Participants get insights to new research topics from the field of IT-Security and learn to call the presented research into question. In this, they deepen and broaden their knowledge in this field. Moreover, participants improve their presentation techniques by giving talks during the seminar.
Description
New research topics from the field of IT-Security are presented in this semiar. Some of the presentations are for TUM-members only. Details on the presentations can be found on the web page of the institute.
Prerequisites
Master in Elektrotrical Engineering or Computer Sciences
This seminar is provided every winter semester. It is part of the regular MSCE program and is held in English.
Up to 15 participants can be accepted for the course.
Attendance during all seminar dates is obligatory.
We offer two 1.5 hour seminars on presentation techniques as well as one 1.5 hour seminar on scientific writing.
Below you can find a list of currently available topics. If you are interested in one of these topics, please contact the corresponding supervisor using the link next to the topic. You might also suggest your own topic.
Topics for the next semester will be available on this side approx. one month before the beginning of the lecture period. Students on the waiting list in TUMonline will be informed when the topics are online.
Oil and Vinegar and Mayo - Comparison of Multivariate Post-Quantum-Cryptography (PQC)
Beschreibung
Multivariate cryptography is the generic term for asymmetric cryptographic primitives based on multivariate polynomials over a finite field, and it is one of the main areas of candidates in the current standardization process for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). Many of the candidates rely on the (Unbalanced) Oil and Vinegar Signature Scheme [1][2]. Among others, two promising candidates are UOV [3] and MAYO [4]. The idea of this seminar topic is to compare the UOV and MAYO signature schemes.
[1] Jacques Patarin. The oil and vinegar signature scheme. Presented at the Dagstuhl Workshop on Cryptography, September 1997. [2] Aviad Kipnis, Jacques Patarin and Louis Goubin. Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes. In EUROCRYPT 1999, LNCS vol. 1592, pp. 206–222. Springer, 1999. [3] https://www.uovsig.org/ [4] https://pqmayo.org/
An often-cited advantage of key storage with physical unclonable functions (PUFs) is that protection mechanisms for stored cryptographic keys need only be active during runtime. Since the secret only exists while the device is active, expensive secure non-volatile storage is no longer needed.
A comprehensive evaluation of such claims however, needs a clearly defined attacker model. Especially in the domain of memristor-based PUFs, discussions of attacker capabilities have been far from commonplace. Some works (e.g. [1]) discuss measures to harden the PUF primitive against prospecitve attackers, some discuss specific attacks (e.g. [2]), while others use the memristors as non-volatile storage (e.g. [3]).
The aim of this work is a
literature review of memristor-based PUFs with a
focus on their explicit and implicit security assumptions,
summarising the results into predominant categories for attacker models.
