# Databox as a Platform for Monitoring IoT Devices at the Edge

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# Privacy in a Connected World

- Mobile and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices
  - Rich sensors
  - Ubiquitous connectivity

- Privacy when connected
  - Transparency
  - Control



# Defining "Privacy" in This Work

#### Personal information

- Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- Multimedia
  - e.g. private photos
- Device activity
  - e.g. streaming videos





- Transport security
  - Encrypted vs Plaintext
- Destinations
  - Third party: e.g. trackers
  - Other party: e.g. cloud hosts
  - Foreign jurisdictions

## Goal


Is it possible to measure privacy exposure from IoT devices by analysing the network traffic they generate?

We aim to develop systems that:


- automatically identify personal information exposure
- analyse those corresponding privacy issues from multiple perspectives
- Give control back to the users and reshaping the IoT ecosystem

## IoT Testbed

**US: Northeastern University** 



**UK: Imperial College London** 




## **Threat Model**

- Personal Information: Stored, Sensor, or Activity data
- Parties: First, Support, Third
- Privacy Concerns
  - Information goes to non-first parties/different jurisdictions
  - Information goes to first party unexpectedly
  - Activity data inferred by non-first parties

# Design of Experiments

- Idle: during night
- Controlled Interaction
  - Manual (3 times)
  - Automated (>30 times) => to detect when certain activity happens
    - Text-to-speech to smart assistants (Alexa/Hi Google)
    - Monkey instrumented control from Android apps



34,586

experiments

# Value of the Study


Difference between the two regions

 Unique dataset and set of experiments


## Data: Destinations

- Device
- IP
- Host
- Amount of traffic sent and received
- Lab
- Experiment
- Network


## Destinations



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
### Who Are Contacted by Many Devices?




- Non-first party organizations receive information from many loT devices
  - US devices tends to contact more

## Geolocation

- Band width = bytes of traffic
  - UK Lab: 8 overseas (UK) + US
  - Overseas: Mostly China (Alibaba Cloud)




## Solutions: Databox!




# Solutions: IoT Databox App

A user-side application running locally allowing to monitor the IoT devices, interact with them, understand their operation.



# Solutions: IoT Databox App





# Solutions: IoT Databox App

- 1.Detecting and Limiting Unnecessary Communication for Consumer IoT Devices
- 2.Do IoT devices communicate with destinations which are not critical or essential to their operations?
- 3. Are there any patterns or trends on the unnecessary destinations among different devices?
- 4. Regional differences

## Threat Model

Personal Adversary: unnecessary destinations

Victim: IoT device user

Scope: consumer IoT

# Challenges


Self-validating experiments

 Combinatorial problem: blocking a destination may make other destinations appear/ disappear.

Blocking update servers

# But this is just the begging...

Add other functionalities to the app



## References

#### **Databox**

https://www.databoxproject.uk/



Jingjing Ren, Daniel J. Dubois, David Choffnes, *Anna Maria Mandalari*, Roman Kolcun, Hamed Haddadi. **Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices: A Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach**. To appear in *Proc. of IMC*, 2019.

## **BBC World News**



BBC News Technology: Would you recognise yourself from your data? https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48434175

**BBC Click: Who has my data?** 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m0005cx6/click-gdpr-one-year-on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32gV9AEQCII