Due to the recent advances in quantum computers, the search for cryptosystems that survive quantum attacks is of great interest. Code-based cryptography is a promising candidate, since it is build on the NP-hard problem of decoding a random code [1].

The McEliece cryptosystem is a promising candidate for asymmetric encryption.
However, many attempts at constructing a code-based signature scheme have resulted in impractical parameters or security problems.

NIST's announcement of a competetion dedicated to standardizing post-quantum signatures has lead to the publication of several new code-based schemes

In this work we consider LESS [2] a signature scheme based on the hardness of the code equivalence problem [3]. State-of-the-art solvers of the problem [4] are analysed and modifications are made to improve their performance.

References:

[1] Weger, V., Gassner, N., & Rosenthal, J. (2022). A Survey on Code-Based Cryptography. arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.07119.

[2] Barenghi, A., Biasse, J. F., Persichetti, E., & Santini, P. (2021). LESS-FM: fine-tuning signatures from the code equivalence problem. In Post-Quantum Cryptography: 12th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2021, Daejeon, South Korea, July 20–22, 2021, Proceedings 12 (pp. 23-43). Springer International Publishing.

[3] Barenghi, A., Biasse, J. F., Persichetti, E., & Santini, P. (2022). On the computational hardness of the code equivalence problem in cryptography. Cryptology ePrint Archive.

[4] Beullens, W. (2021, July). Not enough LESS: An improved algorithm for solving code equivalence problems over F q. In Selected Areas in Cryptography: 27th International Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada (Virtual Event), October 21-23, 2020, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 387-403). Cham: Springer International Publishing.